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Abstract
The global financial safety net (GFSN) has become a complex regime. Regional financial arrangements (RFAs) have emerged
alongside established IMF structures. How relevant are RFAs and the IMF in moments of financial crisis? And more specifically:
Do member countries resort to RFAs as complements or as substitutes to IMF lending? To answer these questions, we devel-
oped an original data-set on the GSFN use by the 61 emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) that are members
of existing RFAs between 1976 and 2018. We find that not only economic criteria such as lending volume, timeliness and con-
ditionality drive patterns of complementarity and substitution in crisis finance, but that RFA governance structure and regional
independence matters. The data show that borrower-dominated RFAs are used much more frequently than creditor-domi-
nated RFAs. Moreover, RFAs which lack regional policy autonomy but are dependent on the IMF are not called upon – even if
they have far superior volumes of potential lending capacity.
Policy Implications
• Coordination between all GFSN elements beyond exchange of information is necessary if untapped resources of the GFSN
are to be utilized in a more effective way. Such coordination requires including currency swap providing central banks as
relevant actors in the GFSN.
• Coordination between GFSN elements needs to take into account the regional and institutional peculiarities that each RFA
entails. The status quo of the GFSN requires a pluralistic debate on the future of a decentralized short-term lending sys-
tem.
• The institutional autonomy of RFAs is of particular importance if they are to be utilized as alternative sources of crisis pre-
vention and backstop.
• If their resources are to be utilized for crisis prevention and backstop, RFAs need to design institutional governance in a
way that allows including large creditor countries to gain lendable volume and at the same time balancing power to give
borrowers adequate voice in decision-making processes.
Today, about US$3.5 trillion is available in liquidity resources
from various institutions and arrangements to backstop
financial or economic crises. Aside from the markedly
increased available financing volume, the set of institutional
arrangements that provide prevention against or backstop
during a financial crisis – known collectively as the global
financial safety net (GFSN) – is considerably more complex
today than a decade ago.
Scholarly elaboration on the GFSN is a recent and evolv-
ing field. The once-exclusive provider of emergency finance
– the IMF – has been the focus of academic controversies
ever since. The adequacy of its governance structure, its
lending programs, and policy conditionality attached is sub-
ject to debate (Dreher, 2009; Grabel, 2011; Stiglitz, 2002). By
contrast, the GFSN has not yet received the same scholarly
attention. The dominant debate addresses the decentralized
status of the GFSN and the question of how to coordinate
its elements. Some authors see the IMF as the undisputed
hub of the GFSN, due to its preferred creditor status that it
needs to maintain, as well as its global membership (see
EPG, 2018; Henning, 2020). At the same time, criticism of
this view has been voiced and a pluralistic debate on the
future of a decentralized short-term lending system has
been brought up as more adapt to the status quo of the
GFSN (Grabel, 2017; Helleiner, 2016).
Helleiner (2016) systematizes three strands of literature on
the legacies of the 2008/09 global financial crisis for GFSN
governance: first, literature on the different dimensions of
GFSN decentralization (such as McKay et al. 2011); second,
literature on enhanced possibilities for coordination between
the decentralized GFSN components with a view on the
shock-absorbing capacity of the GFSN (such as Scheubel
and Stracca, 2019); and third, literature on the design of a
decentralized but coordinated GFSN.
In vein of the third and more dismissed strand of litera-
ture, according to Helleiner (2016), in acknowledging the
decentralized status quo of the GFSN, we engage with the
following research question: Do member countries resort to
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regional financial arrangements (RFAs) as complements or
substitutes to the IMF and, if so, why? By complementary
use, we refer to the parallel resorting of a country to more
than one source of emergency finance. By substitution, we
refer to a substitution of one emergency finance source with
another by giving preference to the other despite having
available other borrowing options of comparable volume.
We use the institutionalist concept of regime complexity
(Alter and Raustiala, 2018) as a framework for analyzing
countries’ strategies in dealing with the current state of the
GFSN. To the best of our knowledge, regime complexity lit-
erature has not yet been applied to investigate borrowing
behavior of emerging markets and developing countries
under financial stress (see for a conceptual analysis DeBurca
et al., 2013; for an application to Europe Henning, 2016,
2019). We argue that the GFSN can be understood as a
regime complex with a predominantly non-hierarchical and
uncoordinated decision-making structure for crisis finance.
Furthermore, overlapping membership coins the GFSN.
Alter and Raustiala (2018) analyze different strategies to
deal with increasing complexity, including contested multi-
lateralism. In this case, the creation of alternative institutions
to challenge existing ones characterizes a regime complex
(see also Morse and Keohane, 2014). Our interpretation of
the status quo of the GFSN is one of contested multilateral-
ism, particularly with emerging market and developing
economies (EMDEs) searching for alternatives to the IMF to
prevent or backstop financial crises.
The economic literature analyzes the GFSN crisis preven-
tion and backstop capacity based on the indicators of lend-
ing volume, and selectively includes timeliness of liquidity
provision (see, for example, Denbee et al. 2016; Scheubel
and Stracca, 2019). McKay et al. (2011) provide a more dif-
ferentiated view on the IMF and the RFAs that includes fur-
ther variables, such as their institutional set up or lending
conditionality. In earlier work, we suggested analyzing the
GFSN based on the variables of lending volume, timeliness
and conditionality that can be derived from the three gener-
ations of balance of payments crises models. Central to
these models is the idea that there is a limited stock of any
asset, which is depleted by either policy errors or investors’
flight, or a combination of both. While the first generation
explains attacks on a currency with a fixed exchange rate as
the result of inconsistent government policies or the flight
out of public bonds under the assumption of rational expec-
tations, second-generation models do not necessarily
assume a clear-cut policy failure but include the possibility
of multiple equilibria for countries with economic policies
that are not clearly unsustainable. This leads to the possibil-
ity of a self-fulfilling debt or fiscal crisis (Cole and Kehoe,
2000).
Third-generation models of financial crises (e.g. Corsetti
et al. 1998) reveal the cumulative negative consequences of
balance of payments crises for countries holding external
debt. In these cases, the reinforcement of international debt
and domestic financial crises is assumed to augment the cri-
sis. All models reveal that prevention and backstop of bal-
ance of payments difficulties in a situation of temporary
illiquidity requires a quick third-party intervention with volu-
minous and adequately conditioned short-term lending
(Krugman, 1999; Obstfeld, 1996).
In the first-generation models, any liquidity provision from
outside must be conditional on an adjustment program to
achieve a rebalancing of public finance and prevent moral
hazard. In the second- and third-generation models, a shift
in expectations can trigger a crisis. In such cases – even
without a change in underlying fundamentals – it is difficult
to pinpoint one specific reason for the occurrence of a crisis
(Krugman, 1999). The implication in both of these models is
that if a third party – such as one or more of the elements
of the GFSN – can guarantee continued access to loans at
sensible interest rates, expectations in a ‘good’ equilibrium
will stabilize and a self-fulfilling crisis will not occur. The
timeliness and sufficiency of the provided liquidity are the
key criteria for the third party to reduce financial vulnerabili-
ties. Assessment of both, timeliness and sufficiency, are sub-
ject to an ongoing debate (see, for example, Orszag and
Stiglitz, 2002).
Nonetheless, in M€uhlich and Fritz (2018) and Fritz and
M€uhlich (2019), by examining the explanatory contribution
of these variables, we found that they only provide a par-
tial explanation for patterns of crisis borrowing in the
GFSN.
The present analysis provides a twofold enhancement of
our previous research. Theoretically, to our knowledge, we
provide the first combination of economic theory of crisis
finance with the concept of regime complexity to the
GFSN to detect further explanatory variables that influence
countries’ borrowing decisions in a situation of multiple
and overlapping borrowing options. Empirically, we update
our previous data set (M€uhlich and Fritz, 2018), and
include two further RFAs, whereby we cover, to our knowl-
edge, all six existing RFAs among EMDEs2.. We analyze 446
cases of borrowing activities in the GFSN of 61 EMDEs that
are members of one of the six RFAs between 1976 and
2018.
The case selection of all RFAs between EMDEs is based on
the method of difference: we suppose that EMDEs share
important commonalities in their crisis borrowing such as
their inability to indebt themselves in their own currency
abroad and their higher vulnerability to sudden stops com-
pared with advanced economies so that these countries are
more likely to be hit by third-generation balance of pay-
ments crises model-like crises, as outlined above (Eichen-
green and Hausman, 2005). Moreover, the debate on the
IMF’s governance structure joins EMDEs as the group of
under-represented countries in the old Bretton Woods insti-
tution, the IMF. However, the member countries strongly dif-
fer in what holds interest for our analysis: they utilize their
RFAs quite distinctively in terms of frequency, complementa-
tion and substitution. We aim to scrutinize the role that the
institutional setup of RFAs plays – apart from lending capac-
ity, time to disbursement, and conditionality – as an
explanatory variable for the variation in crisis borrowing
from the IMF and from the RFAs. For this aim, due to the
small number of RFAs, we use descriptive statistical analysis
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and explore possible correlations between observable bor-
rowing patterns as the dependent variable, and lending
conditions and governance variables as independent vari-
ables.
1. Regime complexity in emergency finance
Since 1976, the GFSN had been dominated for decades by
the IMF and a few small RFAs that were set up as institu-
tionalized jointly administered regional funds, such as the
Arab Monetary Fund (AMF; founded in 1976) and the Latin
American Reserve Fund (FLAR, according to its Spanish acro-
nym; 1978). With the Asian financial crisis and particularly
the global financial crisis, new, more voluminous RFAs were
created, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI; 2001), later
the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM; 2010),
the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD;
2009), the swap arrangement of the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC; 2012), and the BRICS
Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA; 2014) of the New
Development Bank, the latter being the first trans-regional
RFA. The complexity of the GFSN additionally increased with
the emergence of numerous voluminous bilateral currency
swap arrangements. With the global financial crisis, all GFSN
elements considerably expanded their lending capacity.
Standard economic literature offers an analytical frame-
work for the reasoning on third-party liquidity provision to a
crisis-affected country in the three generations models of
balance-of-payments crises (Krugman, 1999; Obstfeld, 1996).
The latter suggest that crisis lending should be voluminous,
timely and adequately conditioned to prevent or backstop a
liquidity shortage. Nonetheless, based on a sample of 50
EMDEs between 1976 and 2018, Fritz and M€uhlich (2019)
find that volume, timeliness and conditionality are not the
only drivers of the borrowing patterns of crisis-affected
countries in the GFSN.
The present analysis extends beyond the economic liter-
ature, whereby we suggest more closely examining ele-
ments of the political economy of crisis borrowing and
lending. We analyze the proliferation of the provision of
short-term finance as a regime complex in which ‘more
than one institution is involved in addressing a given pol-
icy issue’ (Alter and Raustiala, 2018, p. 333). We character-
ize the GFSN as a regime complex where: (1) membership
and therefore the loan portfolios of the IMF, RFAs and,
additionally, the newly emerged central bank currency
swaps partially overlap; (2) the GFSN elements exist in a
non-hierarchical relationship; and (3) lending rules and reg-
ulations are not coordinated. The regime complexity con-
cept is appealing for our research question as it enables
focusing ‘on how the overlapping and sequential nature of
international commitments in itself shapes the politics of
cooperation [. . .] and the decisions of actors operating
within and around regime complexes’ (Alter and Raustiala,
2018, p. 331). (1) Membership, mandate and resource over-
lap exist in the GFSN. While all countries in our sample are
members of the IMF and an RFA, some of them are or
have also been partners to a bilateral currency swap
arrangement. Accordingly, all countries have at least two
and sometimes three crisis borrowing options. (2) In terms
of non-hierarchical relationship, some authors argue the
IMF is the hub and rule setter of the GFSN, among others
due to its preferred creditor status, the long period of
unique operation and expertise in crisis finance, as well as
its lending capacity (see, for example, Drezner, 2013; Hen-
ning, 2020). Furthermore, the IMF and the RFAs have inten-
sified their dialogue over their respective roles and
decision-making processes in the GFSN (ESM, 2018; IMF,
2017). Yet, these efforts have so far not materialized in a
coordinated GFSN lending policy. Neither does the IMF
determine lending rules for all elements of the GFSN: aside
from joint capacity building and technical cooperation,
most RFAs independently determine their lending rules
and regulations. Exceptions are the CMIM and the contin-
gent reserve agreement (CRA), which prescribe an IMF pro-
gram above a certain lending volume. Currency swap
agreements are made bilaterally between national central
banks without any involvement of further institutions.
The key feature is that there is no agreed-upon
means to assert a hierarchy when rules or decisions
backed by different institutions conflict. The
absence of hierarchy also influences the strategy of
different actors and introduces dynamism into the
politics of cooperation. [. . .] decisions made in one
forum can be influenced, revised or undermined by
decisions and politics within a parallel or overlap-
ping [. . .] forum. (Alter and Raustiala, 2018, p. 331)
(3) Borrowing countries under financial stress need to deal
with institutional overlap and rule density. Lending rules
partially contradict; for example, Ecuador may have access
to a de facto non-conditional loan from the FLAR while it
simultaneously needs to negotiate the conditionality for an
IMF loan with the latter. Other EMDEs may have additionally
negotiated currency swaps between the central banks with-
out any conditionality (Denbee et al. 2016). Thus, today’s
GFSN complexity is not only coined by a significant overlap
of supposedly rule-setting actors, but also by different
modes of governance (McNamara, 2016).
The complexity of the GFSN has increased, among others,
due to changes in the relative economic and financial power
– particularly of emerging economies – that are not
reflected in the old Bretton Woods institutions, such as the
IMF.
[International institutions] are slow to change and
serve to lock in temporary advantages. [. . .], the
IMF, and the World Bank, for example, all give spe-
cial roles to the US and its European allies that
today poorly reflect existing power realities. Conse-
quently, rising powers may prefer to create a new
institution, where their influence may be larger,
than seek to reform an existing one. (Alter and
Raustiala, 2018, p. 338)
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The contestation of outdated shareholder structures is also
related to the search for local or regional governance solu-
tions that may allow for a stronger voice of the participating
stakeholders. We suggest reading the proliferation of institu-
tions and agreements not solely as a competitive but rather
as a pragmatic search for financial crisis solutions. Some
contributions on the GFSN and in particular on RFAs high-
light the importance of regional cooperation as learning
ground for supra-national policy coordination (Ocampo,
2006).
The regime complexity literature recognizes the produc-
tive element of the competition and the resource increase
that complexity introduces (see DeBurca, 2013). For the case
of the GFSN, Grabel (2017) applies a Hirschmanian reading
of the status quo of crisis finance mechanisms and – outside
a predetermined school of thought – labels the process that
the regime complexity concept describes as one of ‘produc-
tive incoherence’. She assumes that the incremental
changes of the GFSN over time are productive in the sense
that new options for crisis prevention and backstop emerge,
which are more prone to the regional needs of EMDEs than
existing global institutions.
The question of how the overlap of membership, lending,
enforcement and surveillance rules, and the access to differ-
ent emergency finance sources in the GFSN shapes the bor-
rowing strategies of crisis-affected countries, has not yet
been examined extensively in the literature. The economic
framework of currency crises models suggests that a crisis-
affected country primarily chooses the GFSN mechanism
that provides the largest amounts of short-term liquidity in
a timely manner with no or lean reform obligations as policy
conditionality (M€uhlich and Fritz, 2018).
Here, we operationalize the regime complexity concept
for the case of EMDE crisis borrowing in the GFSN. Based
on the regime complexity concept, we assume that the
borrowing decisions of crisis-affected countries are not
explainable solely by economic criteria. Moreover, we
assume that the search for a stronger voice and regional
governance mechanisms also play a role. The regime
complexity concept suggests that countries combine or
substitute borrowing options in the GFSN in a way that
allows as much influence as possible over the crisis pre-
vention or resolution strategy. Therefore, issues of power
asymmetries that find their expression in the different
positions of lenders and borrowers in each GFSN element
are important.
We draw on the concept of Humphrey and Michaelowa
(2013) who introduce the idea of balance of power in the
shareholder structure of a lending institution, and who dis-
tinguish between borrower- and lender-dominated arrange-
ments.3. We add the category of shareholder structure to
the previously introduced categories of voice and regional-
ized governance to address the potentially different effects
that GFSN complexity may incur for countries with different
economic size and weight within their RFA.
Regarding intra-regional power relations and asymmetries,
RFAs constitute a special and ambivalent case: the more
asymmetric that an RFA is in terms of its members’
economic size, the greater the economic benefits, whereby
comparatively large (supposedly creditor) economies can
increase the lending capacity of the fund to comparatively
small (supposedly borrower) economies. At the same time,
regional asymmetry entails challenges for the political econ-
omy of lending and borrowing. Lending policy, surveillance
and enforcement rules need to satisfy borrower and creditor
countries (see also Grabel, 2017; Henning, 2016).
According to Alter and Raustiala (2018), politically and
economically powerful countries have stronger leverage in
exercising their will in a complex regime. Furthermore, Drez-
ner (2013) finds that regime complexity enhances more
power-based results than coordinated and institutionalized
settings of multilateral agreements with predictive decision-
making rules, where inequalities in economic and political
power are at least partially leveled out. While the regime
complexity concept presumes that politically or economi-
cally more powerful countries have stronger leverage, we
assume that that GFSN complexity gives less powerful coun-
tries a small but non-negligible leverage in terms of using
and combining different GFSN elements. For example, in the
case of a comparatively small country like Ecuador, easy
access to a small regional fund provides a timely and non-
conditional liquidity source either before negotiations about
a more voluminous IMF program (ESM, 2018), or to even
substitute the IMF.
2. Truly regional? Balance of power and
autonomy of RFAs
In order to analyze GFSN utilization from a country perspec-
tive, we examine two sets of variables: first, we analyze the
three standard economic key criteria for crisis finance,
namely volume, timeliness, and conditionality; and second,
we derive three different governance variables from the
concept of regime complexity, namely the shareholder
structure (examined as the distribution of capital shares)
voice (examined as the distribution of voting shares), and
the degree of policy autonomy in regional lending deci-
sions. We employ the concept of balance of power by
Humphrey and Michaelowa (2013), who examine the bal-
ance of power of multilateral development banks (MDBs)
along the composition of shareholders. In the case of
MDBs, the authors concentrate on the inclusion or not of
(advanced economy) creditor countries. In contrast to
MDBs, RFAs show a high variation of power distribution in
their institutional set-up, and RFAs have no formal distinc-
tion between borrowing and lending countries as is the
case in the official development assistance (ODA) based
MDB system. Thus, for our classification of RFAs as bor-
rower- or creditor-dominated, we additionally consider the
distribution of voting power. We classify an RFA as bor-
rower-dominated when the influence of a member country
is not determined by its capital contribution and as credi-
tor-dominated if the influence of member countries is
determined by capital contribution.
We employ these six criteria to examine the complemen-
tary or substitutive use of the IMF and RFAs. We compile a
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time series data set with 446 cases in which one of the 61
RFA member countries in our sample agreed on one or
more financing programs with the IMF, its RFA or a currency
swap, between the year of the RFA’s foundation and 2018.4.
2.1. The IMF: global creditor dominance
The IMF has undergone considerable changes in its eco-
nomic lending terms since the end of the Bretton Woods
system in 1973. First, the fund multiplied its lending capac-
ity over time and in particular after the global financial crisis.
Together with temporary borrowing arrangements and
increased member country quota, the funds’ lending capac-
ity has been raised to about US$1 trillion in 2018 (see Fig-
ure 1). Second, the IMF has established fast track loan
disbursement options, and third, it has substantially over-
hauled its financing facilities, among others by introducing
pre-qualification-based credit lines (IMF, 2014) in addition to
its standard conditional lending.
Regarding its balance of power in shareholder representa-
tion, in 2016, the IMF implemented a reform of the fund’s
shareholder structure that had been requested for a long
time: the 14th IMF quota review shaped its asymmetric
shareholder structure towards EMDEs. Even though the US
retains its dominant status, the share of EMDE votes
increased by about 6 per cent to reflect their enlarged glo-
bal economic share. Brazil, China, India, and Russia have
been among the ten largest member countries of the IMF
since then. Nonetheless, the IMF governance and share-
holder structure as well as its lending policies and condition-
ality continues to be severely criticized (Dreher, 2009;
Grabel, 2017; Stiglitz, 2002; Stubbs et al. 2020).
In terms of voice and voting structure, the US retained a
veto power, with the largest voting share of 16.5 per cent of
all votes. Out of the 24 seats in the executive board, only
Japan, China, Germany, France, the UK and Saudi Arabia
hold a single seat, apart from the US. Votes are combined
from a small share of basic votes (5.5 per cent of all votes),
and votes based on quota payments. The IMF comprises
two major governing bodies: the executive board takes
management decisions, while the board of governors takes
strategic decisions. We classify the IMF as dominated by
advanced economies as creditors. Its shareholder, voting
and governance structure does not leave much say for most
EMDEs as borrowers.
2.2. RFAs: Regional variation of economic characteristics
and governance
2.2.1. The Latin American Reserve Fund
Regarding its economic characteristics, the FLAR has a rather
small volume of about US$3.9 billion5.. The FLAR disburses
loans quickly (Rosero, 2014). While formally a reform pro-
gram needs to be presented prior to loan disbursement for
all facilities, de facto the FLAR does not impose conditional-
ity at all.
The voting rules in FLAR are strictly egalitarian: while lar-
ger members contribute higher capital shares than the
smaller ones6., each country has one vote in the two gov-
erning bodies (FLAR, 2020). The General Assembly of finance
ministers is responsible for strategic decisions. The board of
directors of central bank governors addresses lending deci-
sions and operational questions. Decisions are taken by a
three-quarter qualified majority, and thus, veto power is pre-
cluded. The FLAR has an autonomous governance mecha-
nism with independent regional rules and regulations. At
the institutional level, the FLAR seeks exchange with other
institutions like the IMF, although this does not concern the
credit disbursement procedure as such.
Between 1978 and 2017, the FLAR was demanded 52
times by its member countries for its programs, compared
with the IMF being requested 41 times. The FLAR is pre-
dominantly in use as a single source of emergency finance
in about 65 per cent of all drawings regarding the RFA. A
parallel IMF program was agreed upon in about 21 per cent
of all RFA drawings in the same year7.. The FLAR has been
used more often than the IMF by those countries that are of
smaller economic size and hence more likely to find an ade-
quate loan size.
We classify the FLAR as borrower dominated since all
countries are formally provided with the same influence on
the proceeds of the fund, independent of their capital con-
tribution. The egalitarian governance structure and high
regional policy autonomy are seen as important ingredients
for the strong sense of ownership within the FLAR (Ocampo,
2006), as is also evidenced by the fact that, despite the
absence of conditionality, FLAR member countries never fall
into arrears. The FLAR’s lending capacity alone can certainly
not explain its frequent utilization, as the finance volume
provided is relatively small for most member countries, com-
pared with their IMF quota (see Figure 2). At the same time,
many cases of stand-alone borrowing from the FLAR – in
particular by Ecuador – can be explained by the aim to
avoid subordination under the creditor dominated IMF (see
also Bunte, 2019).
2.2.2. The Arab Monetary Fund
Created in 1976, the AMF has a subscribed capital of about
US$3.8 billion. The finance volume provided cannot be con-
sidered adequate for any of its member countries, in com-
parison with the IMF (see Figure 3). The AMF has a very
timely disbursement policy, and the conditionality applied
depends on the lending volume and maturity.
Regarding its governance structure, the largest capital
shares are contributed by a few economically strong oil
exporters, which together make up for about 40 per cent of
total subscribed capital of the 21 member countries (see
Figure 3). The AMF is managed by a board of governors
and a board of executive directors. In the former, each
member country holds a fixed number of votes plus one
additional vote for each share held. Decisions are taken by
absolute majority (AMF, 1976), so that the largest members
cannot decide alone. Out of the eight seats in the executive
board, three are single seats held by the largest member
countries, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Iraq, giving no member
a veto power. Further, the AMF has a regionally designed
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autonomous decision-making structure about loan approval
or denial.
AMF is the most frequently used RFA in our sample, and
the majority of drawings were not complemented by other
sources. Even the larger members have been or are frequent
borrowers, despite its small volume and despite – for exam-
ple – Morocco having access to the prequalifying facilities of
the IMF. Between 1976 and 2018, the fund was requested
179 times by its member countries in any of its facilities. In
60 per cent of all AMF drawings, the AMF was the single
emergency financing source. The IMF was requested 58
times over the same period. In about 15 per cent of all RFA
drawings, a program with the RFA and the IMF was agreed
upon in parallel. Egypt, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the Uni-
ted Arab Emirates have been or are partner to a swap
agreement, most of them with the People’s Bank of China
(PBOC). The UAE currency swaps aim to enhance trade.
Egypt, Morocco, Qatar, and Sudan partner currency swaps
with the twofold purpose to enhance trade and financial
stability. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar have never
requested the AMF.
We classify the AMF as a mix of a creditor- and borrower-
dominated institution. Small contributors are given a voice
as basic votes contribute to an equal distribution of voice
and the largest shareholders together hold less than half of
all votes in the governing bodies. Even more than in the
case of the FLAR, economic theory would suggest a non-use
of the AMF due to its very small lending capacity. However,
with a regime complexity perspective, the AMF’s institu-
tional autonomy, and a regionally set-up governance frame-
work with the possibility to have a stronger say than in the
IMF explains the highly frequent and often stand-alone bor-
rowing from the AMF.
2.2.3. The Eurasian fund for stabilization and
development
In 2009, the EFSD was established with a funding volume of
about US$8.5 billion. Membership is strongly asymmetric,
with Russia clearly dominating in terms of economic size
and paid-in capital. Available documentation suggests that
the EFSD disburses considerably slower than other RFAs
(Fritz and M€uhlich, 2019)7.. Conditionality appears to be
extensive and rigorously monitored. The EFSD provides volu-
minous crisis finance for three of its members.
The highest and only decision-making body is the council,
which comprises the member states’ finance ministers and
is chaired by the Russian finance minister. Decisions are
taken by a 90 per cent majority, a rule that requires Kaza-
khstan – as the second major creditor country – to vote
with Russia to gain a majority. If one assumes that voting
Figure 1. Institutions and lending capacity in the global financial safety net over time (USD).
Notes: NAFA – North American Framework Agreement; ESM – European Stability Mechanism; EFSM – European Financial Stabilization Mecha-
nism; EU BOP – EU Balance of Payments Assistance; EU MFA – EU Macro Financial Assistance. ESM, EFSM, EU BOP and EU MFA lending
capacity per country is estimated by a country’s relative GDP share as approximation of the maximum borrowing amount of the total vol-
ume. ** We follow Denbee et al. (2016) by assuming that the reciprocal nature of currency swaps among advanced economies requires
counting each swap twice, and by assuming that the unlimited swap lines between the US Fed and the ECB, Canada, Japan, United King-
dom, and Switzerland can be estimated by the amounts drawn during the global financial crisis, which sums up to about USD 600bn. When
we apply these assumptions to our estimates for 2018, the amount of total active swaps sums up to about least USD 1.5tr. *** Although
the short-term lending of multilateral development banks (MDBs) is part of the GFSN, their inclusion is beyond the scope of this analysis
(see Grabel, 2017, pp. 164).
Source (The data can be made available on request): IMF (1947, 1989, 2007, 2008, 2018, *n.d.a), FLAR (1989), FLAR 2018), AM (1977, 2019), AMRO
(n.d), Denbee et al. (2016, updated by D. Essers and Vincent, 2017 and by the authors; Kawai and Houser, 2007; BRICS, 2014; EFSD n.d.a; ESM n.d).
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shares depend on capital shares, Russia has a very strong
decision power in the governing bodies (see Figure 4). The
EFSD has a regionally designed autonomous decision-mak-
ing structure, without institutionalized collaboration with the
IMF (Grabel, 2017; see also ESM, 2018). In exceptional cases,
the reform program has been developed under IMF advice
(Grabel, 2017). Further, in some cases, emergency liquidity
financing is approved as co-lending with other regional or
global financial institutions (Figure 4).
Since its foundation, the EFSD has been drawn upon five
times by Armenia, Belarus (twice) and Tajikistan (twice). The
IMF has been requested seven times by the EFSD member
countries between 2009 and 2018. Member countries have
been or are partner to eight currency swaps, predominantly
with the PBOC, whereby the smaller countries’ currency
swaps have the aim to tighten trade ties with China. Hence,
other GFSN sources have been used more often than the
EFSD by its member countries. Aside from two lending
programs, the EFSD was always complemented by borrow-
ing from other GFSN elements, or used in a sequenced
manner within a short time span.
We classify the EFSD as creditor-dominated due to the
strong dominance of Russia in the proceeds of the RFA. Eco-
nomic considerations alone cannot explain the predominant
borrowing pattern of complementation in the EFSD since
the lending capacity of the EFSD is enormous for some
member countries, compared with the IMF. Complementa-
tion may be motivated by the search for combining differ-
ent sources with varying power balances at the global,
regional and bilateral level instead of subordinating oneself
under one dominant creditor.
2.2.4. The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization
The CMIM was initially set up as a network of bilateral swap
arrangements in 2001 in reaction to the Asian financial cri-
sis. In 2010, in response to the global financial crisis, the
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CMIM was established as a multilateral swap arrangement of
about US$240 billion (Kawai and Park, 2015). Its large lend-
ing capacity provides for crisis finance that exceeds the
lending of IMF for all members except the plus-three part-
ner countries. CMIM states a disbursement time of a maxi-
mum of two weeks. However, given that borrowing above
30 per cent of the quota requires an IMF program, delays in
decision-making are likely.
The decision-making structure of the CMIM comprises a
ministerial and an executive level. The former’s decisions are
taken in consensus, while the latter’s decisions are taken by
a two-thirds majority rule, so that no member holds a veto
power. Each country is given basic votes, plus votes
depending on its contributions. The large plus-three mem-
bers China, Japan and South Korea together with Hong
Kong hold more than two-thirds (71.59 per cent) of the
votes. The CMIM’s lending decisions depend on the IMF
when it comes to borrowing requests of more than 30 per
cent of the country quota. CMIM is continuously expanding
its capacities to develop regionalized lending, surveillance
and enforcement rules and decision making.
The CMIM has never been requested by its members (see
Figure 5). CMIM member countries hold significant foreign
exchange reserve volumes, so that financial shocks are less
likely to occur. At the same time however, the majority of
its member countries became partner to a currency swap,
most of them with the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and
the Bank of Japan (BOJ) (see Table A2, Appendix). The
majority of the bilateral currency swaps between CMIM
member countries that have been set up in parallel to the
CMIM had the purpose of temporary liquidity provision to
enhance financial stability. The IMF has only been requested
three times in 2000 and 2001 when the CMIM was about to
be founded.
Given the huge influence that the plus three partner
countries exercise on the proceeds of the arrangement, we
Figure 3. AMF - Lending capacity and borrowing patterns.
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classify the CMIM as creditor-dominated. A solely economic
perspective would suggest frequent stand-alone borrowing
from the CMIM, based on the voluminous crisis finance that
the RFA can provide. Nonetheless, we observe a strategy of
circumventing the similarly creditor-dominated IMF. We sup-
pose that the CMIM’s unattractiveness is, among others,
caused by in the creditor-dominance and the non-au-
tonomous decision-making of the RFA and hence to the
stigma that accompanies IMF borrowing since the Asian
financial crisis.
2.2.5. The South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) swap arrangement
Since 2012, India has offered currency swaps to SAARC mem-
ber countries in the SAARC swap arrangement as a measure
‘to address short-term liquidity difficulties and to supplement
international financing arrangements’ (RBI, 2012). As
endorsed by all member states at the SAARCFINANCE Group
Meeting in 2011, the Reserve Bank of India makes available a
swap facility to all SAARC member countries to strengthen
regional financial and economic cooperation. It has a total
volume of US$2 billion with a maximum swap amount of US
$400 million per country. Compared with the IMF, half of the
SAARC member countries would not find sufficient crisis
finance in the swap with India. At the same time, the timeli-
ness of disbursement and probably absent policy condition-
ality may cause a preference over other GFSN sources
available to SAARC member countries.
In contrast to the other RFAs, the SAARC swap arrange-
ment has no institutionalized governing body but it is com-
manded by the Indian central bank (RBI). We classify the
SAARC swap agreement as a creditor-dominated arrange-
ment with little formalization. The SAARC is autonomous as
the RBI alone defines the rules.
Between 2012 and 2018, the RFA was tapped three times,
twice by Bhutan and once by Sri Lanka. The IMF was
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requested four times by the member countries and seven
bilateral currency swaps were agreed upon between SAARC
member countries and the PBOC or the RBI in parallel to
the SAARC agreement. While Bhutan requested the SAAR
swap arrangement as the single crisis finance source, Sri
Lanka drew on all three GFSN elements multiple times (in-
cluding bilateral currency swaps with the PBOC to enhance
trade ties and with the RBI to increase financial stability).
Further, Nepal and Pakistan complemented IMF programs
with currency swaps with PBOC predominantly for trade
finance (not shown in Figure 6). Aside from Bhutan, SAARC
member countries predominantly resort to bilateral currency
swaps and complement different GFSN elements (see Fig-
ure 6).
The comparatively small share of stand-alone drawing on
the SAARC swap arrangement is not only motivated by the
relatively small lending capacity that it provides for most
borrowers. Rather, they seem to complement different GFSN
elements to indebt themselves in the short-term from
different sources with different power balances and gover-
nance structures.
2.2.6. Contingent reserve agreement
The CRA was founded as the first trans-regional RFA in 2014
as part of the New Development Bank by the BRICS coun-
tries. China dominates the RFA, in economic terms and with
a capital contribution of 41 per cent. The CRA – like the
CMIM – is based on a multilateral swap contract with a total
volume of US$100 billion. As in CMIM, only 30 per cent of a
country’s committed capital can be drawn; otherwise, an
IMF program is required. Thus, the CRA is not designed
autonomously but binds more voluminous lending to the
IMF. For at least two of the five CRA member countries, the
RFA’s lending capacity is comparable with the IMF (Figure 7).
The CRA is governed by a governing council that decides
by consensus. It is composed of finance ministers or central
bank governors. An operational standing council decides by
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simple majority. The standing council can also decide by
simple majority, in which case each country receives a basic
vote of five per cent of total voting power in addition to
the capital share-based votes. The arrangement is designed
in such a way that no member holds a veto power while
the largest creditor China has a strong influence.
Since its existence, the CRA member countries have nei-
ther tapped their trans-regional fund nor requested the IMF;
rather, six bilateral swaps were agreed upon between 2014
and 2018 between CRA members or with other countries.
The currency swaps had predominantly the purpose of tem-
porary liquidity provision; few of them had a twofold aim of
enhancing trade and financial stability, only one swap was
agreed with the single purpose of trade enhancement.
We classify the CRA as a creditor-borrower-dominated
arrangement, with a strong influence of the largest capital
contributor but without a veto power. Similar to the CMIM,
we suppose that its substitution by bilateral swap arrange-
ments can be explained by the absence of autonomous
regional decision-making for more substantial borrowing
amounts and the stigma associated with IMF-linked borrow-
ing.
Table 1 summarizes the findings for all RFAs regarding
their economic characteristics, governance structure and
patterns of use.
3. Conclusion
Regime complexity literature offers several possible explana-
tions for the institutional overlap between the global and
regional level in the global financial safety net (GFSN),
among those of the explanation of contested multilateralism.
We examine the latter empirically based on the borrowing
patterns of the member countries of the six regional financial
arrangements (RFAs) that exist between EMDEs. We aim to
understand how regime complexity drives RFA use as a sub-
stitute or complement to the often-contested IMF crisis bor-
rowing. We find a surprising complexity: RFA utilization
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considerably varies not only with economic criteria such as
the lending volume but also with governance mechanisms,
such as the intra-regional balance of power and the auton-
omy of decision-making at the regional level. Along this gov-
ernance variance, we identify three patterns of borrowing.
First, RFAs that lack regional policy autonomy and instead
bind themselves to the IMF – such as the CMIM and CRA –
are not utilized at all. The member countries’ voluminous for-
eign exchange reserves may explain why financial shocks are
less likely to occur. Yet, at the same time, numerous currency
swaps that have been agreed upon in parallel to each regio-
nal or trans-regional fund had predominantly the aim to
increase financial stability and provide temporary liquidity,
and that, together with the high levels of currency reserves,
might serve as substitute for drawing on the CMIM, as the
stigma attached to IMF borrowing spreads over to the RFA.
Second, regionally autonomous RFAs that are clearly domi-
nated by their intra-regional creditor countries – such as
the EFSD and SAARC – are utilized predominantly as
complements to other GFSN elements even though most of
the borrowers find extraordinary lending capacity in their RFA.
Especially the small members use extra-regional swaps as
complement, mostly with the aim to ease trade finance with
China, but also to increase financial stability. Borrowers of
creditor-dominated RFAs face power asymmetries in all of
their GFSN options at the global, regional and bilateral level,
albeit each in different forms. Entering into debtor relations
with the IMF dominated by advanced economies, with a
regional hegemon or with another economically strong lender
country creates a kind of complexity which seems to require
case-specific cost-benefit analysis of borrowing each time.
Third, borrower-dominated or mildly creditor-borrower
dominated RFA with autonomous regional governance –
such as the FLAR and AMF – are most frequently utilized,
and mostly as stand-alone finance sources. Interestingly, and
against economic wisdom, countries draw on these mecha-
nisms despite the relatively small sums provided. We do not
find a strong pattern of complementation or substitution by
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other GFSN elements. We see reasons to conclude that this
behavior is related to the balanced power and regional
autonomy of these mechanisms. We conclude that the bor-
rowing patterns of creditor-dominated RFAs without attach-
ment to the IMF, suggest that it is not only US-dominance
in the IMF, but more generally the dominance of a larger
country in a lending mechanism that makes this mechanism
less attractive.
Based on our empirical analysis and elaboration of these
patterns, we conclude that, the capacity to provide regional-
ized governance is vital for an RFA to serve as a truly new
alternative to dissatisfying old institutions. Having a voice in
an independent and autonomous regional institution is
attractive for EMDEs, which we observe even in cases where
lending volumes are too small to substitute the IMF. The
creation of regional funds for crisis finance thus incorporates
a major challenge, namely balancing the tension between
the economic advantage of voluminous RFAs with economi-
cally larger countries and the quest for a voice by the smal-
ler members.
Finally, we find that – in contrast to what the regime
complexity concept would suggest – non-hierarchical
complex regimes do not necessarily result in higher
gains for more powerful countries; rather, it results in a
complex pattern of power balances and leaves countries
with difficult choices. The ability to complement or sub-
stitute one source of crisis liquidity with another at the
same time depends on the available crisis finance
options with adequate volume. Here, bilateral currency
swaps are very attractive, being voluminous, quickly
available and with no conditionality attached. However,
they are offered where advanced and emerging econo-
mies such as the US and China have economic and
geostrategic interests. The emergence of this dense but
skewed network of bilateral swaps as non-institutional-
ized instruments thus brings enormous challenges to the
GFSN due to their new power imbalances, opacity and
unpredictability. We conclude that if their resources are
to be utilized for crisis prevention and backstop, IMF and
RFAs require not only to provide voluminous, timely and
adequately conditioned short-term crisis finance but also
governance mechanisms that allow for autonomous deci-
sion making, and an institutional set up that allows bal-
ancing power to give borrowers adequate voice in
decision-making processes.
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Notes
1. We thus exclude institutions such as the ESM, which covers mostly
advanced economies; the only exception in our sample is Japan as
one of the main lending countries in the CMIM. For an overview of
the RFAs covered and their member countries, together with their
capital contribution by member countries, see the annex.
2. The authors empirically examine lending of overlapping MDBs in
Latin America. Empirically, they find higher lending by borrower-
dominated institutions during non-crisis times and vice versa for
creditor-dominated institutions.
3. We analyze all cases in which a financing program has been agreed
on either with the RFA or the IMF, or in which a swap agreement with
a foreign central bank has been concluded. For each case, we identify
which other GFSN components were accessible and used or not used
by descriptive time series analysis. Data are taken from the RFA’s
websites, central bank websites, media reports, and IMF Members’
Financial Data by Country database. Central bank swaps between
EMDEs are only counted once, on the account of the supposedly eco-
nomically weaker country that is assumed to be a beneficiary of the
currency swap. We include only those swaps that are agreed upon
with other countries out of our sample (M€uhlich and Fritz 2018).
4. For a more extensive discussion of the economic key variables of the
FLAR, the AMF, the CMIN and the EFSD, see M€uhlich and Fritz (2018);
Fritz and M€uhlich (2019).
5. For the distribution of capital shares for all RFAs analysed here, see
Appendix, Figures A1–A8; for a list of all RFA member countries, see
Appendix, Table A1.
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6. Figures do not round up to 100 percent since the total number of
drawings on the RFA includes multiple drawings on different RFA
facilities in the same year.
7. The EFSD is the only RFA that offers short-term crisis finance and
long-term development finance. Here, we only examine the short-
term Financial Credit Line that the EFSD provides.
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Source: FLAR (2018), FLAR (n.d.b).








VOTING SHARE IN % OF TOTAL
Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador
Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
Source: FLAR (2018), FLAR (n.d.b).
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CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION IN % OF TOTAL
Armenia 0,01% Kyrgyz Republic 0,01% Belarus 0,12%
Kazakhstan Russian Federaon
Sources: EFSD (2019), EFSD (n.d.a).









CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION IN % OF TOTAL
Japan China Hong Kong Korea Indonesia
Thailand Malaysia Singapore Philippines Vietnam
Cambodia Myanmar Brunei Lao
Source: AMRO (n.d.).
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VOTING SHARE IN % OF TOTAL
Japan China Hong Kong Korea Indonesia
Thailand Malaysia Singapore Philippines Vietnam
Cambodia Myanmar Brunei Lao
Source: AMRO (n.d.).






CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION IN % OF TOTAL
China Brazil India Russian Federaon South Africa
BRICS 2014.
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Table A2. RFA member countries
AMF FLAR EFSD CMIM SAARC CRA
Algeria Bolivia Armenia Brunei Darussalam Afghanistan Brazil
Bahrain Colombia Belarus Cambodia Bangladesh China
Comoros Costa Rica Kazakhstan China Bhutan India
Djibouti Ecuador Kyrgyz Republic Hong Kong SAR, China India Russia
Egypt, Arab Rep. Paraguay Russian Federation Indonesia Nepal South Africa
Iraq Peru Tajikistan Japan Pakistan
Jordan Uruguay Korea, Rep. Sri Lanka













West Bank and Gaza
Yemen, Rep.
Table A3. Central bank currency swaps: Sources
Bilateral currency swap part-
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Table A3. (continued)
Bilateral currency swap part-
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Table A3. (continued)
Bilateral currency swap part-
ner countries Year Source
Rep. of Korea-Japan 2005 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/34fc5f7a-dcb6-11e2-9700-00144feab7de.html#axzz43iUb9Hrq
Rep. of Korea-China 2011 http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/967020.html
Philippines-China 2007 Kawai et al. (2014): 101–102





































Sri Lanka-China 2014 https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/sri-lanka-and-china-entered-into-a-currency-swap-
agreement/
Sri Lanka-India 2015 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/currency-swap-agreement-sri-lanka-
receives-1-1-billion-from-india/articleshow/48795184.cms
Note: Bilateral currency swaps between developing and emerging economies that are member of AMF, FLAR, CMIM, EFSD, SAARC, or
CRA 1976 – 2018.
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